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Cartesian doubt is a form of methodological skepticism associated with the writings and methodology of René Descartes (March 31, 1596February 11, 1650). Cartesian doubt is also known as Cartesian skepticism, methodic doubt, methodological skepticism, universal doubt, systematic doubt, or hyperbolic doubt.
Cartesian doubt is a systematic process of being skeptical about (or doubting) the truth of one's beliefs, which has become a characteristic method in philosophy. Additionally, Descartes' method has been seen by many as the root of the modern scientific method. This method of doubt was largely popularized in Western philosophy by René Descartes, who sought to doubt the truth of all beliefs in order to determine which he could be certain were true. It is the basis for Descartes' statement, " Cogito ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am). A fuller version of his phrase: " dubito ergo cogito, cogito ergo sum" translates to "I doubt therefore I think, I think therefore I exist." Sum translated as "I exist" (per various Latin to English dictionaries) presents a much larger and clearer meaning to the phrase.
Methodological skepticism is distinguished from philosophical skepticism in that methodological skepticism is an approach that subjects all knowledge claims to scrutiny with the goal of sorting out true from false claims, whereas philosophical skepticism is an approach that questions the possibility of certain knowledge.
There are several interpretations as to the objective of Descartes' skepticism. Prominent among these is a account, which claims that Descartes' skepticism aims to eliminate all belief that it is possible to doubt, thus leaving only (also known as foundational beliefs).Tom Rockmore, On Foundationalism: A Strategy for Metaphysical Realism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pp. 64–65. From these indubitable basic beliefs, Descartes then attempts to derive further knowledge. It's an archetypal and significant example that epitomizes the Rationalism schools of philosophy.Janet Broughton, Descartes's Method of Doubt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 6.
Mario Bunge argues that methodological skepticism presupposes that scientific theories and methods satisfy certain philosophical requirements: idealism, materialism, realism, rationalism, empiricism, and systemics, that the data and hypotheses of science constitute a system.
Hyperbolic doubt means having the tendency to doubt, since it is an extreme or exaggerated form of doubt.Skirry (2006), p. 115. Knowledge in the Cartesian sense means to know something beyond not merely all reasonable doubt, but all possible doubt. In his Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), Descartes resolved to systematically doubt that any of his beliefs were true, in order to build, from the ground up, a belief system consisting of only certainly true beliefs; his end goal—or at least a major one—was to find an undoubtable basis for the sciences. Consider Descartes' opening lines of the Meditations:
"But when I distinctly see where things come from and where and when they come to me, and when I can connect my perceptions of them with the whole of the rest of my life without a break, then I am quite certain that when I encounter these things I am not asleep but awake."— Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writings
In , Descartes stated that if one were mad, even briefly, the insanity might have driven man into believing that what we thought was true could be merely our minds deceiving us. He also stated that there could be 'evil demon' that had deceived us, preventing us from judging correctly.Ernest Sosa, Steup, M., & Jonathan Dancy, eds., A Companion to Epistemology (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p. 308.
Descartes argued that all his senses were lying, and since your senses can easily fool you, his idea of an infinitely powerful being must be true—since that idea could have only been put there by an infinitely powerful being who would have no reason for deceit.Georges Dicker, Descartes: An Analytical and Historical Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 16.
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